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This volume contains papers that discuss the relationship between political 
corruption and organized crime using both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. The related studies were carried out within the framework of the 
European-Commission-funded ANTICORRP project, a large-scale research 
project being conducted with the participation of research groups from fifteen 
European countries. However, the editor of this volume concentrated only on 
five Eastern European countries in addition to Germany and Turkey in the 
selection of the articles. What makes the book unique and unusual is that these 
papers present cross-national evaluations concerning corruption based on new 
objective indicators instead of the well-known subjective perception indices that 
are usually used for this purpose.
The analyses take into consideration the period between 2007 and 2013 and 
assess corruption risks in the construction sector based on two indicators. One 
of them deals with the practice of single bidding during calls for tenders, while 
the other is connected to the awarding of contracts to companies that have 
political connections. The existence (or co-existence) of such conditions may 
imply the presence of corruption; however, some more characteristics of public 
procurement can also be taken into consideration, such as the transparency of 
procurement procedures and the time that elapses between the announcement 
of tenders and the deadlines for application. The volume is edited by Alina 
Mungiu-Pippidi, a Romanian political scientist and professor of the Hertie 
School of Governance in Berlin.
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The volume’s introductory paper is co-written by the book’s editor and Roberto 
Martínez B. Kukutschka, a PhD candidate at the Hertie School of Governance, 
and draws attention to the anomalies among public procurements. The authors 
begin by citing the significant positive relationship between the amount of 
money in public procurement and corruption, as illustrated by scientific and 
anecdotal evidence. They pose the question how to continue making extensive 
public investment in developing countries without financing the rents for 
political clientele. What may highlight the importance of such a question is the 
fact that the official impact assessments of such investment projects undertaken 
by the authorities of the European Union often lack estimates of the effects of 
new money on corruption risk.
Mungiu-Pippidi and Kukutschka also raise the problem of defining corruption. 
Several terms related to corruption are discussed, such as particularism and state 
capture, which are exclusively associated with the corruption that accompanies 
public procurement. The authors describe a continuum from ethical universalism 
to particularism, with competitive particularism somewhere between; the main 
goal of their study is to locate the majority of government transactions of the 
analyzed countries on this scale.
The researchers have surveyed public procurement in the infrastructure 
sector in one highly developed old EU Member State (Germany), four new 
EU Member States (Hungary, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria), one candidate 
country (Turkey), and a country neighboring (but outside) the EU (Ukraine). 
The authors are concerned about the transparency of public procurement even 
in the benchmark country, but in the case of the new member states they find 
spectacular evidence for particularism. They end their introductory article 
with several recommendations for reducing the resources for corruption and 
for increasing the constraints on corrupt behavior that might help purge public 
procurement procedures of corruption.
The article by Madalina Doroftei and Valentina Dimulescu – economic and 
political researchers at the Romanian Academic Society – presents a detailed 
picture of corruption risks in Romania. The authors offer statistical evidence 
for the existence of particularistic corruption: i.e., how tenders for public 
procurement have been won by companies that are favored by government. The 
authors examine a total of 6064 contracts, coming to the conclusion that both 
features that indicate particularism exist in the Romanian public procurement 
market, as about 40 percent of all agreements were thus affected. A conservative 
estimate presented in the article is that the yearly average value of kickbacks is 
200 million euros. An interesting fact is that EU-funded contracts have much 
less risk of corruption than agreements involving only national funding. In 
addition, Doroftei and Dimulescu state their concern about the accessibility of 
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public-procurement-related data, often due to an absence of political will, not 
for financial reasons – some of their final recommendations also address this 
problem.
The volume continues with a discussion about the Bulgarian public procurement 
market by Ruslan Stefanov, Todor Yalamov and Stefan Karaboev, researchers at 
the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, based on data from Tenders 
Electronic Daily. The authors find that both the number and the value of public 
procurement contracts dynamically increased during the time period under 
analysis; however, the proportion of procurements with single bidders decreased 
from 27 percent to 17 percent between 2009 and 2014. However, regarding the 
perspective of the winning companies, the authors come to the conclusion that 
the share of the top forty construction firms significantly increased after the 
economic crisis of 2008. Also, there are contradictory findings regarding the 
impact of EU funds. In terms of the number of bidders, it is argued that EU 
funding fosters competition. But, as the financial crisis begun and EU support 
replaced national funds, companies became more used to the circumstances 
of EU-funded contracts and devised ways to capture these funds. However, 
the authors conclude that EU-funded contracts still perform better regarding 
corruption risks than national ones.
Stefanov, Yalamov and Karaboev conclude that even if they cannot produce 
exact empirical evidence for favoritism, their results suggest that there are 
some companies that are successful with tendering because of their links to 
government, instead of their performance. The increase in EU funding has 
resulted in better control of public procurement, although this effect recedes as 
the size of tenders decreases. Some recommendations are formulated, mainly 
regarding changes in the administrative and legal framework that could lead to 
a more transparent system and effective action against the financing of the crony 
companies of the government via public procurement.
The Hungarian situation is assessed by Mihály Fazekas, Péter András 
Lukács and István János Tóth, participants of the ANTICORRP project on 
behalf of Corvinus University of Budapest. The authors rely on the data 
extracted from the Public Procurement Bulletin between 2005 and 2012 
and their own data processing methods, while they gathered data about 
companies from the Amadeus database. Following the common framework 
for all the studies in the volume, the authors inquired into the prevalence 
of single bidding and found that the overall share of contracts awarded in 
such circumstances was 25 percent during the period under analysis, and 
reached a maximum of 35 percent in late 2010. Considering the fact that 
the construction sector is highly competitive, the authors find these results 
alarming. However, after new public procurement rules were introduced in 
MIKLÓS HAJDU 204
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 9 (2018) 2
2011, the phenomenon of single bidding became much less common (15-
20 percent), but the authors are still suspicious about how the market is 
concentrated in the hands of a group of companies.
On the other hand, the existence of companies with political connections 
was taken into consideration. The political relations of the winning firms were 
identified using very sophisticated methodology (the authors place great emphasis 
on this, but still indicate some doubt about whether they were able to identify all 
the linkages). In any case, results suggest that government connections have a 
strong influence on the likelihood of winning bids in construction markets, but 
in other areas of the public procurement market, such effects are not obvious. 
The authors conclude that these results are not surprising as they are in line with 
the findings of other experts. Also, they express recommendations regarding 
the need to limit and tailor public funding for the purpose of better controlling 
spending and improving the opportunities to reveal the political embeddedness 
of companies.
Munir Podumljak, President of Partnership for Social Development and 
Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett, a senior lecturer at the University of Sussex, write 
their paper about political favoritism in the Croatian public procurement. 
They begin by raising some concerns about the vulnerability of the Croatian 
contracting authorities to political influence, despite strong procurement-
related regulations; the authors refer to the ideas of Mungiu-Pippidi that the 
existence of considerable opportunities and inadequate constraints create 
an environment suitable for particularism. Political influence over public 
procurement is approached from the perspective of the different kinds of 
contracting authorities that function according to diverse regulatory conditions. 
As the public procurements on the construction market are mainly connected 
to authorities that are subject to political control, and not with tightly regulated 
mechanisms of oversight, numerous opportunities arise for corruption, because: 
1) the top managers of these authorities are appointed by political leaders, 2) 
the former organizations have only weakly controlled balance sheets, 3) formal 
controls are weaker for these institutions than for other types of authorities, 
and 4)  regulatory authorities  lack capacity. A case study about FIMI Media is 
included to illustrate how politics can influence public procurement, but exact 
statistics about crony winners are not available. Only the achievements of the 
most successful state-owned and private enterprises were analyzed.
Concerning the phenomenon of sole bidding, the authors present some statistical 
evidence, but the origin of the data is not clearly explained. Calculations based 
on data about 230 contracts from the Integrity Observers database indicate that 
40 percent of all agreements concluded between 2012 and 2013 were finalized 
after a single bid was received – however, the table presented by the authors 
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suggests that this proportion is about 25 percent. Podumljak and Dávid-Barrett 
do not really explain the origin of their data, nor the conditions under which 
they obtained it. 
The recommendations of the authors address the extensive political control 
over public procurement. Also, the transparency and the accountability 
of the Croatian public procurement system is the focus of several policy 
recommendations. The authors conclude that, despite the public procurement 
law and the fact that the institutional framework is adequate, a large share of 
public procurement occurs outside the control of these instruments.
Two professors from Hacettepe University, Ugur Emek and Muhittin Acar, 
summarize the situation in Turkey. The authors give a brief overview of the 
magnitude of public construction expenses and the legal framework of public 
procurement, focusing on the opportunities for the emergence of and the 
steps taken to eliminate corruption risks. However, their inquiry is based on 
a theoretical-legal approach and includes some highly aggregated statistics. 
No accurate figures are presented to reveal whether the phenomenon of single 
bidding exists in Turkey, and if so, to what extent. Regarding the potential 
linkages between public organizations and private enterprises, the topic of 
public-private partnerships is brought up, and the authors come to the conclusion 
that public procurement and PPPs may have become important sources for 
business development for some companies that have close relations with high-
level representatives of the government. The policy recommendations of the 
authors relate to the problem of the lack of suitable, contract-level data for 
conducting a deeper analysis of the Turkish public procurement sector. This 
absence leads to deficiencies in transparency and accountability – the same 
issue which prevented the authors from engaging in more sophisticated and 
extensive statistical analyses.
Andrew Wilson, historian and political scientist at University College London, 
begins with a strong statement in his study about corruption risks in Ukraine: 
“Ukraine has always been one of the most corrupt post-Soviet states”. The paper 
provides a general overview of the causes and effects of corruption in Ukraine, 
but does not follow the common framework and scope of the earlier studies 
in the volume. Wilson begins by assessing the outcomes of the “Euromaidan” 
protests of 2014 and concludes that the presence of corruption was one of the 
driving forces. He suggests that some positive changes have happened, as there 
is no single ideology or group that now guides reforms, and journalists and civil 
society have more opportunities to reveal corruption. Also, he mentions that 
the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau at the end of 2015 with the 
support of the European Union was an optimistic event as its designers tried to 
avoid the numerous pitfalls that have befallen similar initiatives. Considering 
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procurement, Wilson highlights the decreasing trend to corruption. However, 
he also raises concerns regarding some of the legal and sectoral reforms that are 
lacking (mainly in the energy sector), the presence of oligarchs, particularly in 
the media, and the accessibility of public services. Finally, Wilson cites some 
findings from public opinion polls that suggest that understanding the reforms 
and the new societal willingness to make an effort to implement them are not 
sufficient.
The final study in the volume is written by Salvatore Sberna and Alberto 
Vannucci, political scientists at Scuola Normale Superiore, about a broader 
research effort within the ANTICORRP project that focuses on the interaction 
between corruption and organized crime in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy 
and Kosovo. The authors begin with a careful conceptualization of political 
corruption and organized crime, and also thoroughly discuss issues regarding 
the research methodology (a comparative cross-national study of a sensitive 
topic raises interesting challenges). Based on 29 in-depth case studies, Sberna 
and Vannucci define a number of recurring, general “red-flags” that may 
indicate anomalies in decision-making processes. Also, they present some 
interesting findings; for instance, that in the period under analysis most 
instances of corruption and organized crime were connected with the public 
procurement sector, and that national – non-EU – spheres of decision-making 
are less accessible to criminal organizations because of the lack of transparency 
with the management of EU funds at the country level.
The studies in this volume have been written by scholars, but seem to be more 
like policy reports than academic papers. However, adherence to the proposed 
common analytical structure becomes weaker in the papers presented in the 
second half of the volume (the data sources are insufficient in some countries 
under analysis). This actually helps to maintain interest, as the first articles 
are written to follow a rather repetitive framework. As the statistical analyses 
were based on different kinds of data sources and the quality of the data that 
was available differs significantly between countries, making a quantitative 
comparison is difficult. But, as several problems and similar phenomena were 
raised by all the papers in connection with government favoritism, the reader 
may get some insight into the country-specific details. In my opinion, an 
important overall conclusion of the volume is that the relationship between the 
presence of EU funds and the level of corruption risks is ambiguous in Eastern 
European countries, perhaps due to improper implementation. In summary, the 
volume is highly recommended to those who are especially interested in reading 
about new methods for analyzing corruption, and also for public procurement 
experts. 
